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Promoting energy audits: Results from an 
experiment 
 
Energy audits are key to increase investments in energy efficiency, as they allow to overcome the 
‘information gap’- one of the biggest obstacles to this type of investment. However, on average only 
30% of SMEs said to have carried out an energy audit between 2015 and 2018. This paper assesses the 
effectiveness of policy interventions in promoting energy audits by relying on evidence from a unique 
online experiment, as part of the European Investment Bank’s annual Investment Survey. 1,178 EU 
firms were asked about their willingness to invest in an energy audit, given different scenarios of 
randomly drawn policy interventions. These are a level of support, whether it comes in the form of a 
grant or a tax credit, and whether the audit is conditional on investing in an energy efficiency project 
after. Findings allow us to quantify by how much the probability that firms invest in energy audits 




There is now more than ever an urge to tackle global warming and climate change, as recalled the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) last October 2018 in Seoul, South Korea. As there 
is a direct link between CO2 emissions and global warming (Stamatiou and Dritsakis 2017), the 
emphasis is on reducing the emissions of greenhouse gas. One way to achieve this is by promoting 
improvements in energy efficiency, as the latter is ‘one of the most cost-effective ways to (…) reduce 
energy-related emissions’ (Hirzel and Behling, 2016:5). Energy efficiency captures how efficiently an 
appliance, building, organisation or country uses energy. Besides reducing CO2 emissions, it also 
ensures affordable energy prices, improves economic competitiveness, as well as the security of supply 
(Stamatiou and Dritsakis, 2017).  
One of the effective ways to increase investments in energy efficiency is to promote energy audits, as 
these overcome the information gap on the cost-benefit trade-off that companies face before 
investing in energy efficiency improvements’ projects (Schleich, 2004; Schleich and Gruber, 2008). This 
information gap is due to imperfect information and is one of the biggest obstacles to energy efficiency 
investments. Evidence from the literature shows that firms lack information about opportunities to 
reduce energy costs (Kluczek and Olszewski, 2016; Schleich, 2004; Trianni et al., 2013). Another aspect 
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of imperfect information is the lack of awareness of firms of existing support schemes directed 
towards energy efficiency improvements investments in their countries. Indeed, in our survey, 
36% of EU firms that declared to be unaware of any support schemes in their country were 
ignorant of the fact that their countries had a support scheme for firms of their size or from their 
sector1. 
At the EU level, promoting energy efficiency is a central component of the 2030 Climate and Energy 
Framework and of the post-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework, while support for energy audits 
became an integral part of the 2012 Energy Efficiency Directive under Article 8 (Torregrossa, 2015; 
Brems et al., 2016). The latter states that large enterprises are required to be subject to an energy 
audit by December 2015 and at least every four years thereafter (Hirzel et al., 2016). This requirement 
is nonetheless limited to large enterprises, highlighting the need to encourage SMEs to also undertake 
energy audits. Results from the European Investment Bank Investment Survey (henceforth EIBIS) show 
that on average, only 30% of SMEs surveyed in the general module in 2018 declared to have carried 
out an energy audit over the previous three years, with considerable disparity between the countries. 
According to Figure 1, in Croatia, one SME out of two carried out an energy audit, while in Bulgaria it 
is around one firm out of ten. The data from the EIBIS is representative. 
 
Figure 1. The percentage share of SMEs that declared that they did not carry out an energy audit in 
the three years prior to 2018 using value added weights (%) 
                                                          
1 This percentage comes from our own calculations, based on information gathered in Table 1 below and from 
our database. This percentage is only applicable to SMEs, as per EU law large firms are obliged to have carried 
out an energy audit by 2015, as is discussed further below. 
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While the literature acknowledges that energy audits are effective in promoting investments in energy 
efficiency, less is known about which policy is the most effective in promoting them (Anderson and 
Newell, 2016; Kalantzis et al., 2018). This is where this research becomes essential, as it assesses the 
effectiveness of policy interventions on the willingness of firms to carry out an energy audit by relying 
on unique data from a new online experiment. We look at three dimensions of policy interventions. 
The first one is the level of support, ranging from 10% to 90% of costs. The second dimension is the 
form in which the support comes, meaning either a grant, or as a tax credit. The third dimension is 
whether the energy audit is conditional on investing in an energy efficiency improvement’s project 
after. The analysis also groups firms according to different characteristics, to compare their degrees of 
responsiveness to these policy interventions in the context of energy audits. 
We rely on unique experimental data from an online module of the European Investment Bank’s 
annual Investment Survey, which covers all EU countries and firms with over five employees and four 
economic sectors: manufacturing, construction, services and infrastructure. In the online module, 
firms are shown four screens with different combinations of policy interventions that are randomly 
drawn, and can then decide whether or not they would carry out the energy audit based on the 
scenario. 
This paper makes several contributions. First of all, the existing literature either looks at the 
effectiveness of policy instruments in promoting energy efficiency improvements, or at the impact of 
energy audits on the adoption of energy efficiency technologies, but rarely at the link between policy 
instruments and the implementation of energy audits per se. We aim to fill this gap in the literature by 
assessing the effectiveness of policy interventions on energy audits. Secondly, the few studies that 
exist are limited to single case studies, or household data. In this research, we make use of an exclusive 
firm-level data set that includes all 28 EU countries. Thirdly, our experimental set-up helps us to 
overcome several obstacles that are often found in the literature when it comes to causally linking 
policy measures to outcomes, such as reverse causality and omitted variable bias. This allows us not 
only to assess the impact of different policy measures in terms of stimulating the use of energy audit, 
but also the degree to which these are subject to free-riding; i.e. firms benefiting from policy support 
that would have carried out an energy audit even in the absence of this support.  
The remaining part of this paper is organised as follows. First of all, the existing literature around policy 
interventions and energy audits is reviewed. Secondly, novel data from the online experiment of the 
2018 EIBIS is presented. Thirdly, we introduce our model and methodology. The fourth section looks 
at findings, for all firms and for the different groups of firms. Finally, we conclude with a discussion on 
the methodology and some policy recommendations. 
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2. Literature review 
Since the early noughties, governments and policy-makers have set several targets and taken initiatives 
at both the EU and national levels in order to promote investments in energy efficiency improvements. 
In 2006, the Energy Service Directive targeted a 9% increase in energy saving. In 2009, a 20% reduction 
of CO2 gas emissions target by 2020 was launched. More recently, the 2030 Climate and Energy 
Framework declared to aim for a 32.5% increase in energy efficiency by 2030. The latter also includes 
national incentives for SMEs to undergo energy audits, as the 2012 Energy Efficiency Directive only 
made it compulsory for large companies to carry out an energy audit by 2015 and then once every four 
years. 
Several policy instruments can be used to target energy efficiency improvements. These can be 
grouped into three categories: communication, economic incentives and normative incentives (Blok et 
al., 2002). Communication has to do with the provision of information that is likely to affect firms’ 
decision. Economic incentives affect the costs or benefits of the improvement action. Normative 
incentives imply some compulsory or prohibited action. To give examples for each category, an 
instrument linked to communication can be an energy audit, if the aim of the instrument is to increase 
investments in energy efficiency. The audit would provide the firm with information on how much it 
can save in terms of energy use, if it decides to make a specific investment. Having this information 
can influence the firm’s decision to invest. An economic incentive can simply be a grant or subsidy 
covering a certain percentage of the total costs of the investment. Making binding emission limit 
prescriptions for large firms in the EU is an example of a normative incentive.  
When it comes to the effectiveness of policy instruments, the literature focuses on energy efficiency 
improvement. In a paper on Dutch firms, Blok et al. (2002) assess how effective subsidies, energy 
efficiency standards and negotiated agreements are in boosting energy efficiency improvements. They 
found that government subsidies could explain 15-20% of the latter, amongst others. A wide range of 
studies also look at how energy audits can enhance energy efficiency improvements (Schleich et al., 
2015; Backlund and Thollander, 2015; Barbetta et al., 2015; Murphy, 2014). For instance, Schleich et 
al. (2015) look at the impact of an energy audit programme on energy efficiency measures amongst 
small German companies in the tertiary sector. Using propensity score matching with a logit model, 
they find that the programme was effective in driving the adoption of four generic energy efficiency 
measures (i.e. lighting, insulation, heating and heating optimisation). They also find that estimates are 
higher (lower) for lower (higher) cost measures, and that the effectiveness of audits will vary by 
technology. In a more recent study that is part of the European Investment Bank’s 2018-9 Investment 
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Report, findings also reveal a strong correlation between energy audits carried out and investments in 
energy efficiency improvements (Kalantzis et al., 2018).  
If energy audits prove to enhance energy efficiency improvements, then more attention should be paid 
to which policy instruments are the most effective in promoting these energy audits. The literature on 
this topic is scarce, however. One of the few studies that exists looks at the impact of a publicly 
financed energy audit programme aimed at helping Swedish SMEs finance energy audits (Backlund and 
Thollander, 2015). The programme comes in the form of a grant that covers 50% of an energy audit, 
for total costs that do not exceed 3000 euros. It addresses firms that use more than 500 MWh per year 
or farms with more than 100 livestock units. Initial results are positive, while the authors warn that 
these are still at the preliminary stage, as the programme was only three years old at the time of the 
study. 
One of the reasons why evidence on the effectiveness of policy instruments in promoting energy audits 
is scarce, is because of the difficulty of establishing causality between the two and the ‘free rider 
problem’. The latter refers to the case where firms would have carried out a project or action even 
without a policy intervention. In their studies on Dutch manufacturing firms, Blok et al. (2002) found 
that between half and two-thirds of the firms receiving a subsidy for an energy efficiency improvement 
were free riders, meaning that they would have carried out the investment regardless of the subsidy. 
The authors could make this calculation using two different methods based on survey data, including 
one with a cost-benefit analysis that looks at the profitability of the project, and another where firms 
were directly asked whether they would still have made the investment without the subsidy. No 
comparable data has been collected in the context of energy audits. This drawback has been pointed 
out by Backlund and Thollander (2015) in their assessment of a grant programme on energy audits in 
Sweden. 
One of the main advantages of the format of the survey’s online module used in the present research 
is that it helps overcome this drawback. It puts firms in a spontaneous situation in which they have to 
make a decision on whether or not to go ahead with an energy audit based on randomly drawn policy 
interventions’ scenarios. On the basis of their responses, we can not only calculate firms’ sensitivity to 
changes in policy intervention, but also compare the share of firms that go ahead under a specific 
policy intervention with those that that would without or with a very low level of support only.  
What is particularly interesting from a policy perspective in this context is the comprehensiveness of 
our data. It allows us to make sub-population comparisons, looking at the level of responsiveness of 
firms across different economic sector and the firm characteristics (De Groot et al., 2001; Schleich and 
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Gruber, 2008; Hrovatin et al., 2016). The selection of policy interventions that are part of our random 
experiment were selected in such a way to be as realistic as possible. 
Table 1 gives an overview of the different policy instruments for energy audits that exist at the national 
level across EU countries and some non-EU States2, for comparison. Most of the instruments have to 
do with economic incentives. The content of the table draws from a report by the European 
Commission (Hirzel et al., 2016). It provides details on the different instruments and their pre-
requisites, if applicable. Instruments vary from subsidies, to grant schemes and agreements, to cite 
some examples. Information on the size of the firms targeted and on the country where the 
instruments are applied is also provided3. Many observations can be drawn from this table. First, not 
all EU countries have national policy incentives directed at encouraging energy audits, despite the 
common umbrella of compulsory energy audits for large firms mentioned above. Second, across the 
EU countries with national policy incentives, the types of instruments and their description vary 
considerably. Finally, within the EU countries, instruments can also vary and target firms of different 
sizes.  
To give a detailed example of an instrument, the German Ministry of Economic Affairs launched the 
Energy Audit Scheme for SMEs from all sectors in 2008. The programme includes two types of audits 
that can be combined or used separately. The first one is a screening audit lasting 1-2 days, including 
a short check of the energy-consuming equipment, and giving recommendations for improvement. In 
this case, 80% of the total audit cost is subsidised. The second option allows to have a comprehensive 
audit taking up to 10 days, including a detailed inspection and suggestions for energy efficiency 
measures. Here, up to 60% of the audit cost is subsidised (Brems et al., 2016).  
Country Firms 
targeted 


















Large Subsidies for energy audits Financial 
Bulgaria SMEs 
 
Large & SMEs 





                                                          
2 Only countries that have additional policy instruments that fall outside of the mandatory energy audit for large 
firms in the EU have been included in the table. 
3 Some instruments are more detailed than others, depending on the information available in the report. 
4 These are the different State policy instrument to support the implementation of energy audits. They can be 
regulatory instruments, information-based instruments, financial instruments and voluntary agreements. 
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Industrial Energy Efficiency Targets for industrial energy 
enterprise owners 
Croatia Large & SMEs Subsidies for energy audits (of EUR 6,600 only until 2015) Financial 
Denmark Large & SMEs 
 
SMEs 
Energy saving obligation targeting energy companies 
 
 






Finland Large & SMEs Voluntary Energy Efficiency Agreement Voluntary  







Large & SMEs 
 
Large & SMEs 
 
Large & SMEs 
Energy Consulting Programme (financial support for detailed 
energy audits, up to 80% of funding of eligible costs) 
 
Eco tax cap for manufacturing industry 
 
Special equalisation scheme5 
 
 
BAFA support programme for cross-cutting technologies 
 
 















Italy SMEs Call for co-funding of regional programmes (50% level of support 
with a grant to cover energy audit costs) 
Financial 
Luxembourg Large & SMEs 
 
Large & SMEs 
 
 
Large & SMEs 
Mandatory energy audits for energy-intensive companies  
 
 
Funding scheme for energy audits in energy-intensive companies 
(up to 40% of the audit costs with a limit of EUR 30,000) 
 











Large & SMEs 
 
Large & SMEs 
Malta Enterprise Scheme (co-financing of energy audits by 
national funds) 
 
ERDF Energy Grant Scheme7 
 
 









Netherlands Large & SMEs Long Term Agreements  Voluntary 
Poland Large & SMEs Energy/electricity supply audit of an enterprise9 (subsidy of 70% 
of the eligible audit costs) 
Financial 
Portugal Large & SMEs Refund of energy audit costs10 (50% of the audit costs refunded, 
with a maximum of EUR 750) 
Financial 
                                                          
5 Only applies to companies with an electricity consumption of less than 5 GWh.  
6 Only applies to companies with energy costs above EUR 500,000.  
7 Ran during 2007-2013, currently not accepting further applications. At the time of publication, a new scheme 
was planned under the new EU Funding Period 2014-2010. 
8 Under preparation at the time of publication. 
9 For SMEs it only applies to companies with an energy consumption > 20 GWh per year. 
10 Only applies to companies with an annual energy consumption of less than 1000 toe/year. 
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Energy audit vouchers11 (subsidy of 50% of the audit costs, with a 
maximum of EUR 5,500) 
 
Support scheme for energy efficiency investments (companies 
with <50 employees can apply for funding of up to 70% of the total 
project costs, while medium-sized companies can obtain funding 
of up to 60% of the eligible costs, conditional on having carried out 






China Large & SMEs Top-10,000 programme12 (includes compulsory energy audit and 
rewards if energy saving projects are successfully implemented 
and exceed a minimum savings threshold of 147 TJ) 
Regulatory 
Japan SMEs Free Energy Audit Financial 
Switzerland Large & SMEs 
 
Large & SMEs 
 
Large  
Canton de Vaud audit programme 
 
 
Voluntary target agreements 
 
 










SMEs Industrial Assessment Centres (IACs) (free energy audits for 
manufacturers only conducted by university engineering 
students) 
Information 
Australia Large & SMEs National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act (compulsory 
energy audit if regulator suspects firms that operate facilities with 
more than 25 kt of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) per year not 
to be respecting the obligatory purchase of “carbon units”, which 
are tradable permits for each tonne of GHG emitted) 
Regulatory 
India Large & SMEs Energy Conservation Act (ECA) (compulsory energy audit to nine 
energy-intensive sectors) 
Regulatory 
South Africa Large & SMEs National Energy Efficiency Leadership Network (EELN) Voluntary 
Turkey Large & SMEs Energy Efficiency Law Voluntary 
Table 1. Summary of national policy instruments to promote energy audits in EU and non-EU 
countries 
 
Besides the policy interventions presented in the random experiment that are similar to existing EU 
policy instruments aimed at promoting energy audits, the value of the energy audit is also tailored 
around the firm’s annual energy spend. It is budgeted at 1.5% of the firm’s total annual energy spend, 
                                                          
11 Companies eligible for support are those involved in the primary production of agricultural products with at 
least 100 livestock units and all other companies with a final energy demand exceeding 0.3 GWh/year. 
12 The programme addresses the largest 1,000 energy-intensive companies consuming each more than 5.275 
TJ/year, and representing in total about 33% of China’s energy demand. 
13 Applicable only if companies have electricity costs equivalent to at least 10% of their gross value added, if they 
meet all eligibility requirements, if the refund amount is at least CHF 20,000 per year and if the company signs a 
target agreement with the federal government to increase energy efficiency. Additionally, 20% of the refunded 
tax amount has to be invested in less cost-effective measures that are not an integral part of the target 
agreement. 
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between the lower bound of 1,500 euros and the higher bound of 15,000 euros, and select the lowest 
value14. We describe the data into more details in the next section. 
3. EIBIS data 
The data used in our study comes from the online module of the EIB’s Investment Survey15 of 2018. 
The EIBIS is carried out annually and gathers quantitative and qualitative information on companies’ 
characteristics and their performance, their past and future investment activities, their sources of 
finance, financing issues and other challenges that they might be facing, such as access to finance; 
amongst others. It was initiated in 2016 and aims to build a firm-level data set, in order to provide a 
representative view of the investment situation of firms in the 28 EU Member States. The information 
collected usually refers to the previous financial year of the companies. 
The survey is based on a telephone interview (i.e. the general module) of 12,500 firms from the 28 EU 
Member States. Fieldwork is carried out by the intermediary of Ipsos-MORI. Following the telephone 
interview, companies are invited to take part in an online experiment. The third wave of the online 
module, which is the one we will be using here, focuses on energy efficiency investments. The previous 
two waves were on firms’ preferences for loans characteristics, and on the trade-off between equity 
and debt loan, respectively (Brutscher et al., 2017; Brutscher and Hols, 2018).  
In the preliminary section of the online module, firms are first asked about their approximate total 
annual energy spend16. Then they are asked about whether they are aware of any support schemes 
for similar firms directed towards energy efficiency investments in their countries (Figure 2). Out of 
the firms surveyed, 70% said not to be aware of such scheme, out of which over a third were located 
in countries that actually have a scheme supporting energy efficiency investments. The next question 
is only directed to firms that said to be aware of such schemes, which is the remaining 30% of the firms 
surveyed. It asks about the degree of importance of these schemes in the firms’ decisions to carry out 
an investment in energy efficiency projects. One firm out of five said that it made a big difference in 
                                                          
14 This energy audit cost estimation is tailored around the individual energy cost of the company. This is 
necessary, as the costs of energy audits vary considerably by country, sector and company type. For instance, 
they are cheaper in cohesion countries and more expensive for multinationals (Brems et al., 2016). The costs will 
also depend on the type of audit required, the size of the firm and how energy intensive it is. As stated in Brems 
et al., ‘in practice, many other parameters seem to influence the hours and efforts spent by the auditors and 
therefore the typical audit prices’ (2016). While one could argue that the hypothetical energy audit cost is a 
drawback to our study, it has still been tailored around the firm’s real energy costs. 
15 Henceforth EIBIS. 
16 The online module is divided into four sections. The first one asks preliminary questions on support schemes 
and past experience with energy audits. The second section focuses on energy audits and different combinations 
of policy interventions. Section three looks at the characteristics of energy efficiency investment projects and of 
financing offers. The concluding section captures how firms assess energy efficiency investments to those that 
are not related to energy efficiency.  
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their decision to invest in energy efficiency, while about 54% said that it made some difference. The 
remaining firms claimed that it made no difference at all.  
The last two questions of the preliminary section ask whether the firm has carried out an energy audit 
in the last three years, and if they have not, whether they would go ahead with an energy audit with a 
specific audit cost.  
 
Figure 2. Screenshot of preliminary section question on support schemes (country: UK) 
 
When the firm is asked whether it would be willing to carry out the energy audit, five possible 
responses are suggested. These are whether it would ‘definitely go ahead’, ‘probably go ahead’, ‘might 
or might not go ahead’, ‘probably not go ahead’ or ‘definitely would not go ahead’ with the energy 
audit, as in Figure 3. This is the same for all following questions about the willingness of the firm to go 
ahead with the energy audit.  
An energy audit is defined as a ‘systemic analysis of the energy use and energy consumption’. The 
various dimensions of policy interventions are: the percentage of the cost that will be financially 
supported (i.e. the ‘level of support’- equal to 10%, 30%, 50%, 70% or 90%), whether the support is in 
the form of a grant or tax credit, and whether the support is conditional or unconditional on the firm 
carrying out the investment project following the energy audit. All policy interventions are drawn 
randomly.  
Figure 3 gives an example of the module screen on energy audits presented to a British firm where the 
level of support is 10% with a tax credit conditional on carrying out the investment project after: 
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Figure 3: Screenshot of question on the willingness to carry out the energy audit according to a 
specific combination of policy interventions (country: UK)  
 
Figure 4 gives another example of the module screen on energy audits presented to a British firm but 




Figure 4: Screenshot of question on the willingness to carry out the energy audit according to a 
specific combination of policy interventions (country: UK) 
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Each firm is shown four of these screens with different combinations of policy interventions, all 
randomly drawn. The structure of the experiment presents firms with sometimes more and sometimes 
less favourable policy interventions. Only firms that said that they did not carry out an energy audit 
over the three years prior to when they were being surveyed (i.e. 2018) participated in this section of 
the module.  
A total of 1,178 firms were interviewed. Each firm was shown four screens. Not all firms answered the 
module fully. We treat each observation independently, as all policies were randomly drawn, and as 
we use control variables for firm effects. Figure 5 shows the distribution of observations by country, 
both in terms of numbers and percentage shares. About 8% of the observations comes from Finnish 
firms, while 0.7% come from Cyprus. Firms in Finland, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Belgium and Hungary represent 50% of the total observations.  
 
Figure 5. Observations by country (number of firms and firm percentage share) 
 
4. Empirical methodology and model 
We have gathered the five different possible outcomes shown above (e.g. ‘would definitely go ahead’, 
‘would probably go ahead’, ‘might or might not go ahead’, ‘would probably not go ahead’, and 
‘definitely would not go ahead’) into two possible answers: ‘yes’ or ‘no’17. A ‘yes’ to carrying out the 
energy audit is assumed if the firm replied ‘would definitely go ahead’ or ‘would probably go ahead’, 
                                                          
17 This is inspired by a paper by Brutscher and Hols (2017).  
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and a ‘no’ for all other possible answers18. As the dependent variable is dichotomous (0,1), we use logit 
analysis for the empirical estimation.  
The firms’ preferences can be represented with a utility function. Let’s assume that there are I firms 
indexed by i that can choose whether to go ahead with the energy audit or not in each of the four 
screens shown to them, which are indexed by s=1,…,4. Whether the energy audit is carried out is 
indexed by j∈ {no,yes}. Firm i’s preferences can be represented by a utility function to the extent that 
they meet the conditions of rationality, transitivity and completeness. Preferences are assumed to be 
monotonic, where firms will always prefer more to less, implying a quasi-concave utility function. 
Firm 𝑖𝑖 going for energy audit 𝑗𝑗 from screen 𝑠𝑠 has the following utility function: 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗) = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗) + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1   (1) 
Where 𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝐾𝐾 is an index of policy interventions 𝑥𝑥, 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗) is the unobserved utility function 
derived by firm 𝑖𝑖 going for energy audit 𝑗𝑗, 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 is the coefficient that measures the contribution of the 
policy intervention 𝑘𝑘 to utility.  
While it is not possible to determine utility from the data, it is still possible to identify firms’ 
preferences for policy interventions, such that: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  �
0 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) >  𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠)
1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) <  𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠)
� 
Where 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) is the utility derived from choosing not to go ahead with the energy audit, while 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠) is the utility derived from going ahead with the energy audit.  
Our model looks as follows: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (2) 
Where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the binary outcome, ‘yes’ or ‘no’, on whether the firm would go ahead with the energy 
audit, 𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is one policy intervention dimension for firm i on screen s, 𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is another policy intervention 
dimension for firm i on screen s, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the error term for the specific firm and screen. The 
relationship between 𝑥𝑥1 and 𝑥𝑥2 denotes an interaction term 
In our analysis, 𝑥𝑥1 represents the level of support, which can take the values 10%, 30%, 50%, 70% and 
90%. The variable 𝑥𝑥2 denotes whether the level of support comes with a grant, or whether it comes in 
the form of a tax credit. It takes the value 1 if it is a grant, and 0 if it is a tax credit. This is why we use 
                                                          
18 Whether we put the answer ‘might or might not go ahead’ in the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer group does not alter 
our overall results. 
16 
an interaction term, as the form in which comes the support, i.e. a grant or a tax credit, will certainly 
affect how the support is perceived by the firm. We repeat the analysis for two groups; one where the 
audit is conditional on investing after, and one where it is not19. 
5. Results  
This section presents marginal effects from our logit estimation for all firms, and then by firm groups, 
according to different characteristics. The regressors are the level of support, which is a continuous 
variable, and the interaction between the level of support and the binary variable that takes 1 when 
the support is in the form of a grant and 0 if it comes with a tax credit. The individual term of the binary 
variable is not included, as in our case if the level of support is equal to zero, whether the support 
comes in the form of a grant or a tax credit makes no difference on the probability that the firm carries 
out the energy audit.   
a) All firms 
Table 2 presents the marginal effects from the logit analysis for Equation (2). The coefficient of the 
variable ‘support’ shows how an increase in the level of support affects the willingness of firms to carry 
out an energy audit when it comes in the form of a tax credit (i.e. when the variable ‘grant’ equals 
zero). It shows that for each 10 pp increase in the level of support, the willingness of firms to go ahead 
with the energy audit will increase by 4.2 pp. In the case of support coming in the form of a grant, the 
willingness would increase by 5.2 pp, an increase driven by the value of the coefficient of the 
interaction between the level of support and the grant.  
 
Table 2. Marginal effects from the logit analysis 
                                                          
19 Nota bene: the model assumes an intercept that is ideal for the sub-groups considered, as these are chosen 
randomly, and as a level of support equal to zero should be the same whether it comes with a grant or tax credit, 
and whether it is conditional or unconditional on investing after. 
 (1) 
  
VARIABLES Go ahead with the audit  
  
Support  0.00421*** 
 (0.000288) 
Support  with a grant  0.00102*** 
 (0.000242) 
  
Observat ions 4,712 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
17 
 
The fact that an increase in the level of support implies an increased willingness of firms to go ahead 
with an energy audit is intuitive: it is in the firm’s interest to reduce its costs. The preference for a grant 
over a tax credit follows the explanation that a tax credit is conditional on making profits and not 
operating at losses, while a grant is more easily accessible to all firms and does not come with any 
financial prerequisite. Another reason could be that the grant will be paid right away, while the tax 
credit concretises only the next time taxes are declared. In this respect, grants are transferred directly, 
while the tax credit comes with a time lag. 
 
Table 3. Marginal effects from the logit analysis conditional and unconditional on the investment 
after 
 
Table 3 shows the marginal effects from the logit analysis of Equation (2) when the level of support 
with a grant or with a tax credit is conditional and unconditional on having to invest after.  
A 10 pp increase in the level of support in the form of a tax credit conditional on carrying out the 
investment after increases the probability of firms to carry out the energy audit by 3.5 pp. The same 
support level also in the form of a tax credit unconditional on carrying out the investment after 
increases that probability by 5 pp. If the support level comes with a grant and is unconditional, the 
increase in the probability of the firm going ahead with the energy audit becomes 6.3 pp20. 
Figure 6 gathers all these findings into a simplified graph in order to compare them. To put the situation 
in a more realistic context and based on some already existing subsidy programmes, we look at the 
effect of a 50 pp increase in the level of support with a grant or with a tax credit, and conditional or 
                                                          
20 There is no statistical difference between the two sub-groups. 
 (1) (2) 
   
VARIABLES Go ahead with the audit  
condit ional 
Go ahead with the audit  
uncondit ional 
   
Support  0.00348*** 0.00498*** 
 (0.000399) (0.000417) 
Support  with a 
grant  
0.000757** 0.00128*** 
 (0.000337) (0.000349) 
   
Observat ions 2,363 2,349 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***  p< 0.01, **  p< 0.05, *  p< 0.1 
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unconditional on investing after.  Results show that a 50 pp increase in the level of support on its own 
increases the probability that firms will carry out an energy audit by 24 pp. The probability is 24% 
higher if the level of support comes in the form of a grant rather than a tax credit (from 21 pp to 26 
pp). If this increase comes with a grant and is unconditional on investing after, the probability goes up 
by 32 pp. If it comes with a tax credit and is conditional on investing after, the increase is only of 18 
pp.  
 
Figure 6. Comparison of the impact on the probability that firms carry out the energy audit of the 
different policy interventions’ combinations 
 
If 30% of the firms surveyed said to have carried out an energy audit in the past three years21, a 50pp 
increase in the level of support in the form of a grant would increase this share to 56% (or by 87%). If 
the 50pp increase in the level of support came with a tax credit, this increase would be of 51% (or by 
70%). Put more bluntly, if we wanted to increase the number of firms carrying out an energy audit 
                                                          
21 Based on our sample in the general module of the EIBIS data. 
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from one out of three to at least half of the firms, we would need to increase the level of support by 
at least 50pp22.  
We also carried out a sensitivity analysis to see how the probability that firms carry out the energy 
audit increases when there is a change from a tax credit to a grant in the form of the level of support, 
for each level of support existing in the experiment (Figure 7). Several observations can be made. First, 
the predicted probability is higher, the higher the level of support. Second, the predicted probability is 
always higher when the support is in the form of a grant, compared to a tax credit, for each given level 
of support. Finally, the difference between the predicted probability with a grant and with a tax credit 
becomes larger, as the level of support also increases.  
 
Figure 7. The predicted probability that firms invest when the support type goes from a tax credit to 
a grant for each level of support  
 
b) By group 
One of the advantages of the EIBIS data is that it allows to reproduce the same analysis for different 
groups of firms. The purpose is to compare these groups to assess whether their responsiveness to the 
same combinations of policy interventions varies. The grouping has been done according to different 
characteristics of firms. These are their size, sector, whether they perceive energy costs as an obstacle, 
whether they have high or low energy costs, whether they are financially constrained, their energy 
                                                          
22 We reproduce the same results by giving the dependent variable all five possible outcomes, from 1 to 5, with 
‘1’ corresponding to the reply ‘would definitely not go ahead’ and ‘5’ to ‘would definitely go ahead’. Our findings 
do not change in terms of the most effective combination of policy interventions. 
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efficiency standards, whether they invest in energy efficiency, whether there is a national support 
programme in their country, and the region of the firm.  
Before looking at the results, Figure 8 shows the distribution of observations in our survey according 
to firm sector and size. The distribution is fairly balanced across sectors, with most firms in the 
manufacturing and services sectors (28%, respectively), while 90% of our observations are SMEs. To 
recall, large firms in the EU face compulsory energy audits since 2012. However, firms that took part 
in the online module are those who have not carried out an energy audit in the past three years. This 
explains why only 10% of the firms are large.  
 
Figure 8. Distribution of observations by sector and firm size (percentage share of firms) 
 
Table 4 compares the marginal effects from the logit analyses for the different firm sizes23. Our results 
show that the larger firms are the more responsive to policy support. Also, larger firms seem to be 
more sensitive to the type of policy support, that is whether it comes in the form of a grant or tax 
credit.  
                                                          
23 We exclude large firms for two reasons. First, they only represent 10% of the observations. Second, under EU 




Table 4. Marginal effects from the logit analyses for different firm sizes 
 
The next group analysis is done according to the firm’s sector. Results from Table 5 show that there 
are very few differences in firms’ responsiveness to policy support; but that there are differences in 
what type of support they prefer. While construction sector firms make no difference between grants 
and tax credits, service sector firms and infrastructure sector firms reveal a strong preference for the 
former, most probably reflecting differences in cash flow (across sectors).  
 
Table 5. Marginal effects from the logit analyses for different sectors 
 
We also look at whether firms that are unaware of a support scheme for energy efficiency investments 
in their country (e.g. tax breaks, grants, subsidised loans) respond differently to policy interventions 
than those that are aware. This analysis is based on a question in the preliminary section of the online 
module of the survey, where firms were asked about their awareness of a national support scheme.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Micro Small Medium 
    
Support  0.00372*** 0.00444*** 0.00413*** 
 (0.000496) (0.000480) (0.000524) 
Support  with a 
grant  
0.000492 0.000913** 0.00141*** 
 (0.000391) (0.000405) (0.000452) 
    
Observat ions 1,065 1,606 1,548 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***  p< 0.01, **  p< 0.05, *  p< 0.1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Manufacturing Const ruct ion Services Infrast ructure 
     
Support  0.00441*** 0.00445*** 0.00429*** 0.00386*** 
 (0.000562) (0.000606) (0.000556) (0.000584) 
Support  with a 
grant  
0.00109** 0.000340 0.00117** 0.00130*** 
 (0.000487) (0.000492) (0.000468) (0.000484) 
     
Observat ions 1,311 920 1,303 1,106 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***  p< 0.01, **  p< 0.05, *  p< 0.1 
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Table 6. Marginal effects from the logit analyses for aware and unaware firms 
 
Table 6 shows that firms that are aware of a national support scheme for energy efficiency investments 
are overall more responsive to an increase in the level of support covering energy audits costs than 
firms that are not aware of any scheme of this type; which is likely to reflect the greater concern 
regarding energy costs on the part of these firms. Further analysis further show that firms for which 
energy costs are an obstacle are generally more responsive to policy interventions than firms for which 
they are not (Figure 7).  
 
Table 7. Marginal effects from the logit analyses for firms that say energy costs are an obstacle versus 
those for which they are not 
 
This is also the case for firms that have high energy costs24. This is because these firms are the ones for 
which it is a priority to reduce their costs in energy.  
                                                          
24 Energy costs are measured relative to the number of employees per firm and against the median by country, 
size and sector.  
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Aware Unaware 
   
Support  0.00450*** 0.00410*** 
 (0.000533) (0.000341) 
Support  with a grant  0.00105** 0.000995*** 
 (0.000455) (0.000284) 
   
Observat ions 1,475 3,237 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***  p< 0.01, **  p< 0.05, *  p< 0.1 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Energy costs are 
not  an obstacle 
Energy costs are 
an obstacle 
   
Support  0.00372*** 0.00467*** 
 (0.000396) (0.000416) 
Support  with a grant  0.00112*** 0.000950*** 
 (0.000326) (0.000355) 
   
Observat ions 2,292 2,396 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***  p< 0.01, **  p< 0.05, *  p< 0.1 
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Table 8. Marginal effects from the logit analyses for firms with low versus high energy costs 
The probability that firms carry out an energy audit is higher if they are also financially constrained, in 
both cases where an increase in the level of support comes in the form of a tax credit or as a grant 
(Table 9). This is because these firms do not have an access to finance that would allow them to cover 
all costs of energy audits, or that they would direct their available finance towards other expenses. 
 
Table 9. Marginal effects from the logit analyses for firms that are financially and not financially 
constrained 
Additional information on firms included in our data also allows us to compare firms’ responsiveness 
to the different combinations of policy interventions according to their energy efficiency standards and 
investment in energy efficiency. Table 10 shows how firms with low energy efficiency standards 
respond to the policy interventions compared to those with high energy efficiency standards. A firm 
has high energy efficiency standards if the percentage of its commercial stock building that meets high 
energy efficiency standards is higher than its country’s median. If it below or equal to the national 
median, then it is considered to have low standards. Findings demonstrate that firms with high energy 
efficiency standards are more responsive to support coming in the form of a tax credit, but that when 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Low energy costs High energy costs 
   
Support  0.00390*** 0.00472*** 
 (0.000373) (0.000464) 
Support  with a grant  0.00100*** 0.00123*** 
 (0.000309) (0.000401) 
   
Observat ions 2,672 1,923 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***  p< 0.01, **  p< 0.05, *  p< 0.1 
 (1) (2) 




   
Support  0.00423*** 0.00545*** 
 (0.000322) (0.00107) 
Support  with a grant  0.00108*** 0.00185** 
 (0.000272) (0.000875) 
   
Observat ions 3,872 333 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***  p< 0.01, **  p< 0.05, *  p< 0.1 
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the support is in the form a grant, whether the firm meets low or high energy efficiency standards does 
not matter anymore.  
 
Table 10. Marginal effects from the logit analyses for firms with high and low energy efficiency 
 
Table 11 shows that firms located in countries where there is no existing national support scheme 
programme for energy audits are more responsive to an increase in the level of support, regardless of 
whether it comes in the form a grant or a tax credit, compared to firms located in countries where 
there is a programme. This grouping has been made according to information in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 11. Marginal effects from the logit analyses for firms located in countries with and without a 
national support scheme programme for energy audits 
 
One observation worth noting is that regardless of the firm grouping, an increase in the level of support 
coming in the form of a grant instead of a tax credit always leads to a higher probability of carrying out 
the energy audit in all cases. The differences in the responsiveness of sub-groups of firms to the policy 
 (1) (2) 




   
Support  0.00410*** 0.00455*** 
 (0.000404) (0.000456) 
Support  with a grant  0.00125*** 0.000881** 
 (0.000340) (0.000385) 
   
Observat ions 2,395 1,971 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***  p< 0.01, **  p< 0.05, *  p< 0.1 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES There is no 
programme 
There is a 
programme 
   
Support  0.00439*** 0.00395*** 
 (0.000371) (0.000456) 
Support  with a grant  0.00116*** 0.000803** 
 (0.000310) (0.000386) 
   
Observat ions 2,840 1,872 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***  p< 0.01, **  p< 0.05, *  p< 0.1 
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interventions is nonetheless not to be taken at face value, as in most cases the coefficients are not 
statistically different.  
6. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
This section summarises our results, the contribution of our work, highlights its limitations and makes 
some policy recommendations. 
Using a randomised experiment, this paper assessed the effectiveness of policy interventions in 
promoting energy audits in the EU. We considered three policy interventions: the level of support 
covering the audit costs, the type of support (i.e. grant vs tax credit), and whether the audit was (un-
)conditional on making a follow-on investment in energy efficiency after. Policy support matters when 
it comes to energy audits, as the latter can have a positive influence on energy efficiency investments, 
which themselves come with significant positive externalities. Energy audits inform firms on the 
potential of investments in energy efficiency, and on how their investment is best spent, by 
overcoming the information gap. 
Results show that a higher level of support increases the probability that a firm carries out an energy 
audit, and even more so when it comes in the form of a grant. Conditionality on investing in the project 
after does not seem to matter, and the characteristics of firms either.  
One of the main contributions of this research is that it allows to quantify the effectiveness of the 
selected policy interventions. Findings demonstrate that a 50 pp increase in the level of support 
covering the costs of an audit will boost the probability of it being carried out by 24 pp. If the increase 
in the level of support comes in the form of a grant, the probability that firms carry out the energy 
audit increases by 26 pp, compared to 21 pp if it comes in the form of a tax credit, which is a 24% 
increase.  
The fact that we use a comprehensive dataset for our analysis also makes possible sub-populations 
analysis. This is because we could match the firms’ financial and investment data to their responses in 
the random experiment. In addition, all 28 EU countries were included, and firms from all sizes and all 
economic sectors were covered.  
Our selection of policy interventions was not unfounded, as they closely relate to existing national 
policy instruments put in place in the EU that target energy audits. They also include different 
incentives, related to information, economic or normative. The energy audit costs were also realistic, 
as they were calculated on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the firm’s declared annual energy 
spend.  
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Another important contribution of the present work is the fact that common methodological 
obstacles, such as omitted variable bias, reverse causality and the ‘free rider effect’, are overcome. 
This is because the policy interventions are randomly drawn in the experiment and because firms that 
have not carried out an energy audit in the past three years are put into a realistic situation in which 
they have to make an immediate decision given the information they have. This implies that no other 
explanatory variable is omitted, that it is not the fact that they already carried out energy audits that 
would affect their decision, and that there is no other situation where they could carry out the same 
energy audit without the policy interventions. 
Like all methodologies, using a random experiment also has its limitations. The participation of firms 
in the experiment is voluntary, and hence results also reflect the firms’ stated willingness in a way, and 
hence are to be interpreted with a pinch of salt. In addition, while the coverage of firms is broad, the 
sample of firms that accepted to take part in the online experiment on energy audits is not necessarily 
representative. Despite these limitations, this study on the effectiveness of policy instruments in 
promoting energy audits is the first of its kind, and is hence a good starting point to inform policy-
makers on which are the best measures to boost firms’ willingness to carry out energy audits.  
Several policy recommendations flow from our results. The first one is that financially supporting the 
costs of an energy audit increases the likelihood that a firm carries out the energy audit. As Figure 7 
demonstrates, even covering 10% of the total costs of an energy audit leads to more than one chance 
out of two that the firm carries out the energy audit, other things held constant. If this level of support 
now covers as much as 90% of the energy audit’s costs, then the predicted probability that the firm 
invests in the energy audit will reach between 84% and 88%, depending on whether the support comes 
in the form of a tax credit or a grant, respectively. For any level of support, a 50pp increase in its level 
will lead to a 26pp-increase in the probability that the firm carries out an energy audit if the support 
comes in the form of a grant, and 22pp if it comes in the form of a tax credit.  
In other words, having in place a national support scheme directed towards energy audits can 
considerably affect the number of energy audits carried out. Additionally, an increase in the level of 
support covering the energy audits’ costs will have a positive impact on the probability that firms carry 
them out. This impact will be even stronger if the support comes in the form of a grant, compared to 
a tax credit. 
When it comes to the question of whether policy support for energy audits should be made conditional 
on future investment activities in energy efficiency projects or not, policy makers too have some room 
for maneuver: whereas firms’ willingness to carry out an energy audit is more responsive to a given 
support measure if it is unconditional, the difference between conditional and unconditional policy 
27 
support is probably small enough to justify conditional measures on the basis that they reduce 
‘leakage’.   
Finally, our results give strong support to the idea of better communication of policy measures. About 
36% of firms in our sample said that they are unaware of any policy support scheme in their home 
country (that is applicable to them), even though our research suggests otherwise. When confronted 
with a hypothetical support measure these firms respond positively; albeit less so than firms that are 
aware of existing schemes already. What this suggests is that to have a maximum impact any policy 
scheme (new or existing) needs to be accompanied with a strong communication campaign making 
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